

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~25X1~~

25X1
30 August 1958

25X1
Copy No. C 57

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1
DOCUMENT NO. 25
NO CHANGES IN CLASS.
CLASSIFICATION
CLASS ATTACHED TO THIS DOCUMENT
NEXT BY NAME DATED 2010
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 3127180 REVIEWER:

25X1

*Army, DIA and State Department
review(s) completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 August 1958

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Special Watch Committee Report on Taiwan Strait Situation:

The Chinese Communists probably do not intend to initiate major offensive military action against Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores) in the immediate future, although they now possess a capability for major air attacks.

The Chinese Communists have increased propaganda attacks and psychological warfare on the Nationalists and specifically began warning on 27 August that an invasion of the Chinmens (Quemoy) is imminent.

100

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

The Communists have increased their capabilities to bring heavy pressure on the Chinmens, the Matsus and smaller offshore islands and could launch major attacks against them; with the possible exception of Big and Little Chinmen, such attack could be made without further military build-up and with little or no warning. The ground and logistic forces have been increased near Amoy but the assembly of amphibious lift necessary for the invasion of Big and Little Chinmen has not yet been observed.

The Communists are likely to continue heavy artillery barrages, increase interdiction of supply lines to the islands using artillery, naval, and air elements as necessary, maintain a high state of readiness for air operations, and seize one or more of the smaller offshore islands. It is possible that they will attempt the seizure of one or more of the larger offshore islands.

25X1

25X1

Incidents between US forces and Chinese Communist forces are possible. [redacted]

25X1

OK
USSR: [redacted] observers have sighted a new large delta-wing aircraft on Moscow/Fili airfield. The aircraft was about two thirds the size of the BISON jet heavy bomber. [redacted]

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UV⁶
Jordan: Prime Minister Rifai has agreed that present American aid offers are sufficient for him to withdraw his threat to resign. He has also agreed to consult the United States before asking British troops to withdraw. Popular opposition to the pro-Western regime continues. Withdrawal of British troops still seems almost certain to be followed by a change of government if not an attempt at revolution. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

OK

Cyprus: The relations of EOKA leader Grivas with Athens and Archbishop Makarios are deteriorating. This lessens the ability of the Greek Government and the Archbishop to restrain future EOKA activities.

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

France - Algerian terrorists: The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) campaign of sabotage and terrorism in France is expected to continue through September. French authorities fear attacks in the eastern industrial city of Metz and in western France. The French Communist party probably plans to exploit such activities.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

LATE ITEM

F10
*Soviet nuclear test-ban tactics: In his agreement to commence negotiations on 31 October on suspension of nuclear weapons tests, Khrushchev hinted broadly that the Soviet Union will resume testing unless a test suspension agreement is achieved at the negotiations. The Soviet premier is thus seeking to bring pressure on the Western powers to drop any "conditions"--particularly that the agreement be renewed annually and that progress be achieved in disarmament--in favor of an outright test ban "for all time."

25X1

30 Aug 58

DAILY BRIEF

iv

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Delta-Wing Airplane Seen on Moscow Airfield

25X1

[redacted] observers on 27 August saw a large delta-wing aircraft on the airfield at Plant 23, Moscow/Fili. The aircraft was estimated to be two thirds the size of a BISON, of mid-wing configuration with a large raked tail, a delta horizontal stabilizer, possibly lower than mid-wing, and a slim, tapered nose extending forward of the wing about one quarter the length of the fuselage. There were pods or tanks of about 300-gallon size on each wing tip.

The fuselage appeared oval in cross-section and wider than it was high. The aircraft was seen mainly from the rear, and the fuselage was tilted nose-high, about 20 degrees from the horizontal. The engines were not seen, but the observers had the impression of one or more jet exhausts in the tail of the fuselage. The source indicated that the sighting was very brief and under unfavorable conditions.

This is the latest of several sightings reporting delta-wing bomber aircraft in the past year. It is particularly significant that the aircraft was seen at a known bomber production plant in an area adjacent to a design bureau. Other sightings of varying reliability have been reported in the Barents Sea area during the period 22 October-1 November 1957, and in the Moscow area in the latter part of June 1958.

Because of the circumstances under which this observation was made, information provided by source does not permit a conclusion as to size, number of engines, purpose of wing-tip pods, and many other details.

It is probable that this airplane was assembled at Fili, the site of BISON production. Further observation at Fili may permit early determination of the size, characteristics, and state of development of this new aircraft, of future production plans at Fili, and implications for Soviet long-range aviation.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

30 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Cyprus

The voluntary cease-fire maintained by the Greek Cypriot underground organization EOKA since 4 August may be broken in the near future and new attacks launched against the British. EOKA has been hurt by recent British security drives on Cyprus, and EOKA leader Grivas may be tempted to renew violence before his forces are further reduced by capture or declining morale. He has indicated his dissatisfaction at the "indecisiveness" of the Greek Government and its failure to threaten withdrawal from the Western alliance system unless its allies show greater sympathy on the Cyprus problem. Relations between Grivas and Archbishop Makarios have also deteriorated. A complete rupture in their relations, while improbable at this time, would eliminate one of the few potential restraints on the EOKA leader.

Both Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Averoff appear to favor continued peace on the island while they seek a favorable resolution regarding Cyprus at the next regular session of the UNGA. The British have repeatedly indicated that following a limited period of peace on Cyprus they would permit the return of Makarios from exile--a move much desired by most Greek Cypriots.

Meanwhile, the government of Greece continues its refusal to cooperate in implementing London's new plan for Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, who constitute 80 percent of the population of the island, are also united in opposing the plan. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff hopes this noncooperation will force London to make further concessions to the Greek position. The British, however, realize that further concessions to Athens might cause the Turks to reconsider their decision to cooperate.

Cooperation between Greece and the US continues to be affected by Greek belief that Washington is supporting the Anglo-Turkish "side" in the Cyprus dispute. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

III. THE WEST

Algerians Expected to Continue Sabotage-Terror Campaign In France

The coordinated campaign of sabotage and terror which has been undertaken in France by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) is expected to continue until the 28 September constitutional referendum. The Algerian Nationalists are attempting to undermine the holding of the referendum in Algeria and to discredit in advance any favorable outcome.

French authorities are reported to fear particularly an outbreak of attacks in the eastern industrial city of Metz, and in western France where limited security personnel and open country would favor the success of any attacks.

Following this week's series of attacks on petroleum installations, FLN tactics may turn to sabotaging rail and highway bridges and to bombing crowded public places such as theaters. Despite recent reinforcements, French police agencies would probably need considerable military assistance to protect all likely sabotage targets.

Although the French Communist party (PCF) still appears unwilling to risk the consequences of overt encouragement of violence, the PCF probably plans to exploit the terrorist-sabotage activities to foment distrust of the government's ability to maintain security.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

30 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003900250001-1

TOP SECRET